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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses how a benevolent policy maker should act based on some, possibly non-
welfaristic, ethical principle in cases where people's preferences are not perfectly informed,
consistent and fully developed with regard to all goods, including all kinds of environmental
goods, as is normally assumed in mainstream economic theory. When stated or revealed
preferences do not reflect the maximization of individual welfare, it is argued that welfare,
rather than preferences, has intrinsic value. However, it is also argued that properly designed
stated preference methods may provide useful information about people’s views about
alternative ethical ends, besides human well-being, and that policy makers should take such
views seriously.
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Introduction
Policy conclusions in applied welfare economics, such as environmental economics, normally
presuppose that people have well-defined consistent preferences. However, there is empirical
evidence that people’s preferences with respect to environmental goods are often far from
complete and often highly context-dependent. This paper will therefore discuss policy issues
when people’s preferences may not be consistent, or even developed, with respect to all
goods. Further, it is almost always assumed that what matters intrinsically for public policy is
people’s utilities, and nothing else. However, also this assumption can be questioned in the
environmental field, and there is evidence that some people hold non-anthropocentric ethical
views. We will therefore allow for the possibility that also the environment, or animal
welfare, may matter intrinsically from a social point of view, and not only instrumentally
through people’s utility functions.
Empirical tests have often rejected standard economic assumptions with respect to
people's preferences and behavior. Even though this has been discussed intensively in recent
years (Conlisk 1996, Thaler 1992, 2000), the implications in practice for applied economics,
such as cost-benefit analysis, appear very minor so far. Why is that? There exists at least four
different ways to defend the current practice: 1. Applied work becomes too complicated to
undertake if the standard assumptions are not maintained; 2. Policy recommendations become
less straightforward to derive; 3. The standard assumptions, although strictly incorrect,
provide an approximate picture which is sufficiently accurate for the tasks at stake; and 4. We
must maintain our most fundamental assumptions, otherwise there is almost nothing left of
economics. The fourth reason is of course against what is (or should be) the most
fundamental characteristics of science, critical thinking and work to replace existing theories
with better ones, and can therefore simply be dismissed as non-scientific.
2 The former three
are worth taking seriously, however. It is true that anomalies and deviations from what the
standard theory predicts are sometimes relatively small. There is also a tradeoff between
simplicity and relevance in economics (as in all science, including social science), and
without simplifying assumptions we could not draw any conclusions. So, in some cases the
standard theory appears to be the appropriate one to use. But sometimes it is not. There is
much evidence that expressed preferences and observed behavior with respect to the
environment, as well as with respect to risky choices, may deviate largely from what the
standard theory predicts. It is therefore important to also consider cases where people's
preferences are not perfectly informed, consistent and fully developed with regard to all
goods, including all kinds of environmental goods. For example, how should we handle
situations where people’s risk-perceptions are biased? Should public policy be based on
people’s preferences in terms of choices, or on the consequences in terms of expected
welfare? In discussing these issues we will neglect a number of other important and
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controversial issues such as aggregation problems, equity issues, and intertemporal allocation
problems.
Mainstream normative economics is typically based on either a specific ethical theory,
such as utilitarianism, or on some weaker minimum requirements of the social objective. In
particular, it is almost always assumed that the Pareto principle must not be violated in terms
of individual utilities. This implies that if the social objective is expressed as a social welfare
function (SWF) to be maximized, this SWF  must solely depend on individual utilities. Using
the terminology by Sen (1979), such a SWF is welfaristic. Environmental quality or animal
welfare may then affect social welfare, but only indirectly through the individual utility
functions. This paper, on the contrary, also discusses how a benevolent policy maker should
act based on some fundamental, possibly non-welfaristic, ethical principle, implying that we
allow for more general SWFs where animal well-being and/or environmental quality matters
per se, irrespective of whether people derive any well-being from this or not.
Section 1 discusses generally the choice between individual welfare, as a measure of
individual well-being, and preferences, as reflected in revealed choices or stated preferences,
as an ‘end’ in itself for the government to pursue. It is concluded that welfare, rather than
preferences, is an appropriate end for a reasonable consequentialist ethical theory. Section 2
discusses whether individual welfare should be the only end, or whether there might be other
suitable ends for the government. Based on some empirical evidence it is argued that many
people seem to value the environment intrinsically, and that these views should be reflected
also in social decisions. Section 3 deals with what to do when preferences are inconsistent or
(what may be called) irrational in various ways, including cases with cognitive limitations,
biased risk perceptions, cognitive dissonance, and myopic behavior. Section 4 discusses if,
and if so how, insights on preference formation (or construction) are important from a
welfare perspective. It is argued that the actual preferences we are looking for are those
which reflect welfare as closely as possible, and in addition provide the most accurate
information about the respondents’ view of what should intrinsically matter. Hence,
environmental valuation methods should explicitly be constructed to elicit such preferences.
Section 5 summarizes and discusses how the insights from this paper might be used in actual
policy making.
1. Utility, Preferences and Well-Being
In what is often denoted ‘positive’ economics, such as consumer demand analysis, we are
interested in explaining and describing observed phenomena, for example consumption
patterns in terms of price and income elasticities. The (assumed unobservable) utility function
is then typically defined implicitly as a function (with a small amount of imposed structure)
which is maximized by the observed consumption pattern, or more generally by individuals’
actions, following Samuelson (1938). In general there is an infinite number of utility4
functions that can explain a certain consumption pattern. For example, in the case where a
well-behaved
3 utility function u U x x xn = ( , ,..., ) 1 2  can explain a certain consumption pattern it is
straightforward to show that any monotonically increasing transformation f(u) is consistent
with the same pattern, see for example Samuelson (1947) or De Graaf (1967).
4  The utilities,
representing preferences, can then clearly not be interpreted in a cardinal way, and statements
such as “utility is concave in income” are meaningless.
On the other hand, in what is often described as ‘normative’ economics, including
various kinds of policy analysis, utility (cardinal or ordinal) is used to represent individual
welfare or well-being. Of course, sometimes there is no need to make a distinction between
these two different uses of the word utility. This would be the case if (and only if) people’s
choices can be explained solely by the maximization of individual welfare. Sometimes this is
not the case, however, which appears to be insufficiently analyzed in economics. As
remarked by Broome (1999, p. 4): “Welfare economists move, almost without noticing it,
between saying a person prefers one thing to another and saying she is better off with the first
than with the second.” Here we will therefore distinguish between utility as representing
preferences, on the one hand, and welfare on the other. The preferences are defined by
choices, actual or what they would have been in a real choice situation (as in Broome 1999),
whereas welfare is used interchangeably with well-being, a notion that may be interpreted
more broadly than individual happiness, however.
Many philosophers, psychologists, and also some economists, have criticized the
narrow description of individuals as concerned exclusively with utility maximization.
However, many (most?) economists may consider the following often quoted statement by
Gary Becker in his Nobel lecture on The Economic Approach to provide an effective end to
this discussion: “Individuals maximize utility as they perceive it, whether they be selfish,
altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.” (Becker 1993, p. 386, italics in origin). For
example, there is no doubt that altruistic concern is consistent with, and may be modeled
within the framework of, utility maximization. And if we think of utility solely as something
which is implicitly maximized in order to be consistent with actual behavior, then the
statement is of course tautologically true, but also virtually meaningless as a hypothesis. As
expressed by Samuelson more than 50 years ago: “Thus, the consumer's market behavior is
explained in terms of preferences, which are in turn defined only by behavior. The result can
very easily be circular, and in many formulations undoubtedly is. Often nothing more is
stated than the conclusion that people behave as they behave, a theorem which has no
empirical implication, since it contains no hypothesis and is consistent with all conceivable
behavior, while refutable by none.” (Samuelson 1983[1947], p. 91) To say that people are
                                               
3That is, increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and twice continuously differentiable in the arguments.
4For example, where  f u e
U x x xn ( )
( , ,..., ) = 1 2
or   f u U x x xn ( ) ln( ( , ,..., )) = 1 2 .5
utility maximizers is then like saying that football-players are Sex-minimizers, where Sex is
defined implicitly as something that if it is minimized is consistent with the actual behavior
on the field. The only information we get from this statement, however, is that football-
players’ behavior is not completely random, something which is about as obvious (at least for
someone who knows the rules) for football players as it is for consumers. If, on the other
hand, utility is seen as a measure of individual well-being, then the Becker statement is
certainly not trivially true, but a meaningful hypothesis which in principle is testable and
refutable.
The utility function used in policy-oriented economic analysis, such as most of the
environmental valuation literature, is often (implicitly) assumed to be both a measure of well-
being and of choice simultaneously. This fact is often not recognized, and this is one reason
for the confusion which often arises when interpretations of the results from environmental
valuation studies are discussed; cf. Broome (1991a, 1999), Johansson-Stenman (1998) and
Sen (1991). As repeatedly emphasized by Sen (for example Sen 1977, 1985, 1987), whether
people maximize their own well-being or not is ultimately an empirical question, although
unfortunately a difficult one. Thus, if well-being is defined independently of choice, and an
individual chooses state A to B, it does certainly not follow by logic that the individual’s
well-being must be larger in state A than in B. First, people simply make mistakes, and
second, people may prefer to sacrifice a certain amount of their own well-being in order to
increase some other end, such as ones childrens’ well-being. In particular, the fact that an
individual derives utility from being kind to another person (sympathy, in Sen’s terminology)
does not imply that the kindness is caused by a utility maximizing behavior, since the
behavior may in part be due to some other motive, such as the welfare experienced by the
other person. Hence, the statement by Becker, although perhaps superficially appealing, is not
at all obvious, unless utility is defined in a way so as to make the statement tautologically
true.
5
In the special case when preferences are a perfect measure of welfare, it does of
course not matter whether we choose preferences or welfare as our unit of analysis. But when
preferences and welfare differ, should public decision-making be intrinsically concerned with
preferences or welfare? If we limit our analysis to consequentialism, and rule out right-based
ethics, it appears straightforward that welfare, rather than preferences, is good in itself.
Things may be chosen because they are good, but they are not good because they are chosen.
6
This position is very similar to the betterness principle argued for by Broome (1991b, 1999),
                                               
5To the defense of Becker, however, one should add that he himself does not seem to view individual utility
maximization as a hypothesis, but rather as a method of analysis.
6This is of course not to say that preferences should not be considered in public decision making, since
preferences may often be much easier to observe and they may in many cases be closely correlated with welfare.6
and also related (although not identical) to the view of Harsanyi (1982, 1995, 1997), who has
repeatedly argued that what should matter in social decision making is the true or informed
preferences, that is, the preferences a rational individual equipped with perfect information
would have, rather than actual preferences based on partial information.
7 Still, as will be
argued, not even perfect information and the use of an infinite cognitive capacity will
guarantee that a person’s preferences will reflect his welfare in cases where a person
deliberately chooses to maximize some other end than his own welfare.
  It is also difficult to consistently argue in favor of preferences in cases where
preferences and welfare differ. For example, how should one argue in the common situations
where individuals prefer to have restricted choices (Akerlof, 1991), or that the government
should choose for them? And why would they prefer to have restricted choices in the first
place, if not because what is intrinsically important is welfare, and they believe that welfare
will be higher with restricted choices (including possible cognitive effort etc.)?
2. Beyond Anthropocentric Welfarism?
The standard model in economics does not distinguish between welfare and preferences, but
simply uses utility to represent both, and it is also implicitly assumed that there is nothing
intrinsically important besides individual (human) utility. Here, on the contrary, evidence will
be presented that many people seem to value the environment intrinsically, and it is argued
that the government should take such views seriously.
An anthropocentric and welfaristic social welfare function can be written as
W w u u u
n = ( , ,..., )
1 2
, where W is social welfare and u
i is utility for individual i. Environmental
quality or animal welfare may then still affect social welfare, but only indirectly through the
individual utility functions as follows:
( ) W w u u u
n n =
1 1 2 2 ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ) x z x z x z (1)
where  x
j is j’s consumption of a vector of private goods, and where z  is a vector of public
goods, including various aspects of environmental quality and/or animal welfare. For
example, the suffering of a particular animal species may affect social welfare through
altruistic (or sympathetic) concern in one or many individuals’ utility functions. Even though
such an anthropocentric view is completely dominating in welfare economics, it is not very
often clearly expressed in plain English; Baxter (1974:5) is an exception: “Penguins are
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important because people enjoy seeing them walk about rocks; and furthermore, the well-
being of people would be less impaired by halting use of DDT than by giving up penguins. In
short, my observations about environmental problems will be people-oriented, as are my
criteria. I have no interest in preserving penguins for their own sake.” Although there is no
reason to question that Baxter holds purely anthropocentric values, or that many economists
may do so, empirical findings suggest that many people do not. Stevens et al. (1991), Spash
and Hanley (1995), Russel et al. (1999), and others have found that many people seem not
only to value human well-being, but also nature in itself, including animal welfare. A more
general SWF reflecting such values can be written as follows:
( ) W w u u u
n n =
1 1 2 2 ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ), x z x z x z z (2)
The crucial difference between (1) and (2) is that z is an argument by itself in the SWF in (2),
irrespective of individual utilities. For example, in this case we allow for the possibility that
social welfare may decrease due to animal suffering even if no human being knows (or cares)
about it. The empirical results by Russel et al. are particularly interesting in this respect, since
one purpose in that study was to trigger private, social and ecological preferences
respectively, by changing the framing in words associated with the valuation of a recreation
area. In follow-up questions respondents were asked about motives for their choices,
including questions about whether the well-being of other people or the value of nature per se
had affected their responses. Naturally, most respondents gave “much weight” to the
consequences for themselves and for their family; less than 50% gave “much weight” to the
effects for other visitors. The consequences for “the flora and fauna in the forest”  (that is,
irrespective of other people’s value of the nature) were in all alternatives given “much
weight” for more than 80% of the respondents, and hence also for the alternative with the
private framing! This should be contrasted with the mainstream assumption, predicting that
0% would be influenced by such motives. Although one should interpret such survey results
with great care, there is evidence that many people attach great value to the environment,
irrespective of their own or others’ associated well-being.
Now, given that many people think that the environment and/or animal welfare should
be given some weight in public decision-making, should the government ‘respect’ these
views? Or, more generally, should the government’s objectives be based exclusively on
people’s opinions? This is not self-evident and for example Pigou (1920) argued that it is the
duty of the government to protect the interest of future generations against the current
generations preferences for ourselves. Marglin (1963), on the other hand, argues that the
government should only reflect the preferences and opinions of present individuals (who may
of course have preferences also for people in the future). However, although the general
question is difficult to answer unambiguously, since it relates to conflicts between8
fundamental values and fundamental principles for democratic decision making, it appears
less problematic in our specific case. If most people prefer the government to also consider
the environment per se, and animal welfare, in addition to their own welfare, it seems
reasonable for the government to do so. Hence, in tradeoffs between human welfare versus
nature and animal welfare, it would seem strange if the government would not put any weight
on the value of nature, or on avoiding animal suffering, if that is what most people want it to
do.
It should be emphasized that in order to accept that not only human well-being has an
intrinsic value one need not go as far as some utilitarians (such as Singer 1975, 1979), who
argue that all suffering should count equally (per suffering unit). Nor do one have to accept
that nature or ecosystems have certain absolute rights (see for example O’Neill 1997). Instead
it is sufficient that in tradeoffs between human well-being on the one hand, and nature or
animal well-being on the other, the weights given to the latter should be larger than zero.
3. Imperfect Information and Inconsistent or Irrational Preferences
It is obvious that people often make decisions that they will later regret due to limited or
misleading information. The appropriate response from the government or policy makers in
general is less obvious, however. One could argue that the appropriate role is to provide
more, and more easily accessible, information for individuals to be able to make informed
and rational decisions. However, although information provision is certainly an appropriate
task for public authorities, it has its limitations. First, it is well known that many people, for
various reasons, often simply do not trust publicly provided information (Slovic 2000).
Second, even if they do, it would often be extremely expensive to provide all citizens with
perfect information. This suggests that there would often be a tradeoff between welfare costs
due to imperfect information, on the one hand, and direct costs associated with the provision
of better information on the other. Third, even if perfect information could be provided,
people have limited cognitive capacity, and also time, to process all this information in a
rational way; see Conlisk (1996) for a survey on bounded rationality. Thus, even though there
is a role for public information provision, one must still decide how to deal with situations
where people have imperfect information or limited cognitive capacity. For example, it is
well-known that most people have great difficulties to deal systematically with stochastic
problems, and it is often found that people overestimate small probabilities and underestimate
large ones (Slovic 2000; Viscusi 1992, 1998). This is important since how to construct a
reasonable environmental policy is largely a problem of how to deal with risk, for example
since our knowledge of the ecosystem effects of environmental pollution is very limited.
Pollak (1998) recently concluded a paper by saying that it is still an open issue in
economics how policy makers should react to information about (commonly observed)
systematic biases in individual risk-perception, and that “Utilitarians --and most welfare9
economists and policy analysts approach public policy from a utilitarian perspective -- should
consider whose beliefs (the public's or the experts') should be used to calculate expected
benefits.” Here it is argued that preferences are important only in so far as they provide
information about welfare (or suitable alternative ethical ends), and thus that, in principle, we
are ultimately interested in welfare. In practice, the policy conclusions may be less
straightforward, however. Assume (unrealistically, of course)
8 that we know both the
individuals’ preferences and their cardinal welfare functions perfectly, and that individuals
overestimate a certain risk. Whether an efficient (in terms of welfare) publicly provided risk-
reducing measure should be under or over-provided relative to the first-best (with full
information) efficiency rule, in terms of preferences, is then still ambiguous (Johansson-
Stenman 2000). This is because the marginal change in subjective risk as a function of
objective risk may be smaller than one, even when the subjective risk is larger than the
objective risk. This would be the result if the subjective risk is higher than the objective one
at low risk levels, and lower at high risk levels; Indeed, this seems to be the standard case in
the literature (see for example Viscusi 1992, pp. 139-40). Thus, even if people overestimate a
certain risk it does not follow that their WTP for a certain risk reduction would be larger
compared to the case with perfect information (and vice versa).
Besides cognitive limitations, there are many other reasons why individual
preferences sometimes are poor indicators of welfare, including limited information and
cognitive dissonance. Consider the case of a living area with enhanced radon levels in the
publicly provided drinking water, and where people are thus confronted with a
correspondingly increased risk of getting lung cancer. Assume that individuals to start with
are not aware of any link between radon concentration levels and the probability of getting
lung cancer, and that this information is provided at one specific moment in time. Before this
moment the individuals’ WTPs for measures to decrease the radon level are approximately
zero. After the information is provided the WTPs would naturally increase. Most people
would probably agree that before this information was provided, the appropriate measures by
the authorities should not be based on the actual preferences (reflected in their zero or very
low WTPs). This is consistent with the arguments made so far, since the (expected) welfare
increase of the measure is (approximately) the same before and after the information is
provided, even though the expressed preferences are not. So, we can clearly not use the
before-information preferences as a basis for public decision making. But can we use the
after-information preferences? Possibly, but not even this is obvious.
Consider the possible influence of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957, Akerlof and
Dickens 1982 ). According to this well-established psychological theory individuals try to
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avoid or decrease the ‘dissonance’ between the real circumstances and their view of these
circumstances. Often, this is perfectly compatible with standard rational choice theory, so that
when a person dislikes a certain event she tries to change it so that she likes it. For example,
if you dislike your car very much, and if you are not poor, you will replace it with a car that
you like. Sometimes, however, it is very difficult to change the real circumstances, such as in
the case of radon in the drinking water. Assume that these people cannot move (or that it
would be extremely costly to move), and that they have been living in that specific house for
decades. Either they can fully incorporate the information provided and accept that their
cumulative water consumption will affect their risk of getting lung cancer in the future, or
they may process this information to modify the conclusions towards a view that their risk-
increase is negligible, or at least not that large. Since they cannot change the real
circumstances of the past, the latter alternative may be tempting. If so, the WTPs associated
with measures to decrease these radon levels will also decrease due to this processing. But the
associated expected welfare loss due to the increased risk of getting cancer has of course not
changed.
Consequently, not even the preferences of people with full information can always be
used to guide public decision making, since these may not reflect welfare very accurately.
Actually, this example
9 is not as hypothetical as it might seem. There is much empirical
evidence that people do tend to underestimate the risk associated with enhanced radon levels
(see for example Pollak 1998 and Slovic 2000, chapter 16), for which cognitive dissonance
may be one explanation.
Thus, we have seen that, for various reasons, people’s subjective risk perceptions, and
associated economic values, may be biased. However, the real objective risk may often be
difficult to estimate also for experts. In addition to the obvious fact that this is often an
intrinsically difficult task given the limited scientific evidence available, there is also a
possibility of scientific bias which will be discussed below. Sometimes (perhaps often), a
situation is so complex that it is doubtful whether the standard model, with which the
scientist is familiar, can say very much about a certain phenomenon. Assume that you are an
expert on global computable general equilibrium models of climate change, that you have
invested largely in terms of time and effort to obtain this knowledge, and that you have much
detailed data on natural scientists’ best-guess scenario. Either you could use your data, derive
and compute your results, and claim that your results are important for policy. If you at all
reflect about uncertainty, you conclude that including such aspects would probably not
change anything essential. Or you could do the same thing, but conclude that it is doubtful
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whether any useful policy conclusions could be drawn from the results, since important low-
probability catastrophic events are not included in the model. Consider again the theory of
cognitive dissonance, but this time applied on scientists. Presumably, the first alternative is
more attractive to the researcher, implying an incentive for the researcher to modify her view
of reality in this direction.
The difficulty to deal with such low-probability catastrophic events in a systematic
and scientific way is by no means exclusive for economists, but appears to be valid quite
generally. Thus, the reason for the deviation between experts’ and lay-persons’ risk
perceptions may not solely be that the uninformed public exaggerates possible low-
probability catastrophic events. Experts may also underestimate the expected consequences
of such outcomes, simply since they have no good tool to quantify them. It seems that within
each discipline we typically learn that the tools we have are in general suitable for the
problems we analyze.
Hence, cognitive dissonance, and the mechanisms behind the creation of a self-image,
may work in the direction of considering methods and theories that we do not understand to
be less important. Clearly, no one can understand everything, but it is much more pleasant to
think that what we know is the really important part, than to think that the most important
stuff is known by others. (Presumably, most researchers who have tried to engage in
interdisciplinary work can recognize these and similar problems.)
Another problem is the tendency to discount the future to an irrational extent, which is
much recognized and discussed in the literature, even though it remains a non-conventional
assumption in economic theory.
10 Still, it is discussed by leading economists such as Harrod,
Pigou and Ramsey who colorfully denoted this phenomenon “the conquest of reason by
passion” (Harrod 1948, p. 40), “the faulty telescopic faculty”(Pigou 1929, p. 25), and the
“weakness of imagination” (Ramsey 1928, p. 543). If we, again, are interested in welfare
rather than preferences, such myopic behavior could be an argument in favor of compulsory
pension savings, health insurance etc. The possibility of shortsightedness is of course also a
reality in the environmental field, and not only related to individual but also social decisions.
Indeed, both firms’ and politicians’ narrow shortsightedness are much recognized in the
public discussion.
However, perhaps also the scientific community suffers from some “faulty telescopic
faculty.” For example, the well-known problem of rapidly increasing antibiotic resistance
appears not to have been dealt with adequately, even though the research intensity has
increased recently. The strong link in medical research to commercial interests may be one
reason, since the ‘external’ costs associated with an excessive antibiotic use are not, or at
least very poorly, ‘internalized’. Still, this is hardly the only reason since the social sciences,
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with much looser links to commercial interests, seem to have shown even less interest and
ability to deal with these problems.
11 Thus, rather than primarily an effect of commercial
interests, it may be that most academic disciplines and traditions are poorly adapted to
systematically deal with future problems with a stochastic nature. Based on the literature on
the economics of science (see Stephan 1996 for an overview), one may think of several
mechanisms through the academic reward system (including status and esteem), and through
the funding system. According to Stephan (1996, p. 1226) “the grant system […] encourages
scientists to choose sure(r) bet short term projects that in the longer run may have lower
social value.” Even though it may be very difficult to change these mechanisms directly, an
increased awareness of their existence, by both policy makers and academics, might to some
extent mitigate their consequences. Thus, policy makers must be aware of the fact that many
agents, including academics, may sometimes suffer from various degrees of shortsightedness.
4. Undeveloped Preferences and Preference Formation
Most people have very limited experience of assigning monetary values to environmental
goods, simply because it is typically meaningless in everyday life. One may even question
whether people have preferences for all kinds of environmental goods. For example, can we
have any preferences for a species that is threatened by extinction, if we never knew it existed
before? If we do, these preferences must clearly have been created rather quickly, and are far
from being stable over time, as is typically assumed in theory. Therefore, it is important to
take the process of preference formation seriously. On the other hand, the focus of
environmental valuation should be on individual welfare rather than preferences, and the
(expected) individual welfare associated with environmental goods may be much more stable
than the preferences. Another important task for valuation studies is to elicit people’s ethical
views about other ends besides human well-being.
The standard assumption in the environmental valuation literature, such as the
contingent valuation (CV) literature (Mitchell and Carson 1989), is that people know their
complete preferences with respect to all goods, and that the role of economists is simply to
elicit these. An alternative view, which is more common among psychologists, is that we
have developed preferences for only a few very familiar goods, and that we in most
circumstances use various heuristic choice rules (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kahneman
and Tversky 1979). This hypothesis is supported by many experiments showing preference
reversals, where people in a choice between goods A and B prefer A, but that they still would
be willing to pay more for good B than for good A (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983, Tversky et
al. 1990). For example, in a carefully designed experiment Gregory et al. (1993) found that in
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a choice between improved computer equipment and improved air quality, most people chose
improved air quality. But when asking about their maximum WTP, most people had a higher
WTP for the computer improvement than for the air quality improvement. Further, there is
also much evidence in favor of an endowment effect, so that people demand much more in
compensation to give up a good than they would be willing to pay to get it, and the related
phenomena loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) and status quo bias (Samuelson
and Zeckhauser 1988). There is much evidence that putting a monetary value of an
environmental change is a cognitively very demanding task for which people tend to use
various simplified context-depending choice rules, implying that the responses are often
difficult to interpret (Schkade and Payne 1994; Vatn and Bromley 1994).
Consequently, according to Gregory et al. (1993, p. 179) the appropriate role of CV
practitioners is “not as archeologists, carefully uncovering what is there, but as architects,
working to build a defensible expression of value.” Even if people have no developed
preferences for many environmental goods, their welfare may depend on them, and the
corresponding individual welfare functions may be much more stable than the preferences.
As argued, even though expressed preferences are not reflecting an appropriate ethical end by
themselves, they are important for at least two reasons: First, they may provide a crude
estimate of welfare, and second, they may provide useful information about other suitable
ends in addition to welfare. For example, even if we do not know about certain
contamination, our welfare may depend on it. It may do so either directly, in terms of health
effects, or more indirectly through complex ecosystem effects; and it may be straight forward
deterministic effects, or stochastic low-probability effects. Hence, when preferences are
context-dependent, the actual preferences we are looking for are those reflecting welfare as
closely as possible, and in addition (separately) provide the most accurate information about
the respondents’ view of what should intrinsically matter. Unfortunately, in most existing
valuation studies this distinction is not made; these studies can hence not give any direct
information concerning the respondents’ ethical values. Whether the kind of method based on
multi-attribute utility theory as proposed by Gregory et al. (1993), Gregory and Slovic
(1997), and Slovic (1995) is appropriate for these tasks is, however, a non-trivial issue
beyond the scope of this paper. One clear drawback is the large amount of resources needed
for each respondent, implying that the number of respondents most likely has to be
substantially lower than what is current practice in CVM; according to Gregory et al. (1993,
p. 189): “Depth of value analysis is substituted for breadth of population sampling.” In either
case, some insights from studies based on these methods can hopefully be used also to
improve more conventional stated-preference methods, in particular with respect to cognitive
difficulties and preference construction.
Thus, it is clear that preferences, as defined in terms of actual or hypothetical choices
or decisions, are endogenous and may change due to the framing and circumstances, which14
has been shown both in an experimental setting and from real life experiences. However, this
may in itself not be a major problem in principle, since we are ultimately interested in
welfare rather than preference. Nevertheless, this may imply large problems in practice, since
methods to reveal preferences are often important sources of information in order to
determine or estimate welfare.
But although welfare is probably not as labile as preferences, also (individual) welfare
functions are endogenous and may change over time due to various reasons, including habit
formation, addiction etc. Consider again a person who is severely ill, but who did not know
this until recently. The new information changed the preferences of the individual, but not the
expected welfare associated with the appropriate medical treatment per se. But with the
information comes also possible anxiety and mental suffering. Assuming that this could be
reduced by some kind of therapy, it is clear that also the welfare function has changed due to
the new information. (Before the information there was no anxiety and hence no possibility to
reduce this by therapy.) Obviously, the appropriate task for public decision-makers is to
consider the possibility to reduce suffering given the current state of the world, and not based
on such possibilities last week. This trivial example shows that in situations where also
welfare functions change over time we should, in principle, be concerned with instantaneous
welfare.
In the context of environmental valuation, it is clear that, in addition to so called use-
values, many people’s welfare depend on environmental goods for other motives, perhaps
especially on their own actual or hypothetical contribution to this good (Kahnemann and
Knetsch 1992, cf. Andreoni 1990). In principle, there is no reason why these welfare effects
should not count for social decision making; indeed, moral satisfaction is as real a satisfaction
as other kinds. However, the purpose of a CV study is not primarily to estimate the
respondents’ instantaneous welfare from responding to CV questions, but rather to see the
responses as valid also outside the survey context. And if the moral satisfaction primarily
occurs when responding to the question, all other people who are not part of the sample
would clearly not receive this welfare due to moral satisfaction. This appears to be another
area where much confusion is still present. For example, in a critical comment to Kahnemann
and Knetsch, Harrison (1992) argued that the motive for the respondents’ utilities is
completely irrelevant: “I call my utility ‘jolly’. What you call your utility is (...) your
business” (Harrison 1992, p. 150). In a cost-benefit perspective this is then clearly incorrect,
and the motive behind the preferences and welfare matters a great deal (Johansson-Stenman
1998).
12
There is much evidence that for some environmental goods so called non-use values
                                               
12Due to a somewhat unconventional editorial policy, the reply to Harrison by Kahneman and Knetsch was
never accepted for publication in JEEM. However, the authors did send out letters to all subscribers telling them
that the reply was available personally, and many people received a copy this way.15
play a dominant role. These are often interpreted as various kinds of altruistically motivated
values and, in terms of individual welfare, these can clearly not exist if people do not know
about these goods. But, again, preferences are not only reflecting welfare, but also views
about other suitable ends in addition to welfare. Hence, even if we knew for sure that no-one
would derive any welfare outside the interview situation from the preservation of a certain
species, it may still be worth-while doing so if many people hold values that the species by
itself, or as a part of a larger eco-system, is intrinsically valuable irrespective of human
welfare. Again, however, to be able to elicit such information the valuation studies must be
designed to do so.
 5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper it is argued that when stated or revealed preferences, for whatever reason, do not
reflect the maximization of individual welfare, it is welfare, rather than preferences, that has
intrinsic value. This is illustrated with examples of imperfect information, limited cognitive
capacity, and cognitive dissonance. It is pointed out that also the scientific community may
suffer from different kinds of irrationality, such as shortsightedness or an inability to
systematically deal with problems characterized by a small probability of a catastrophic
outcome, and that policy makers should bear this in mind. Also, when people’s responses to
various kinds of stated preference surveys do not correspond to welfare maximization, they
may in part indicate a non-anthropocentric view, implying that also animals or nature should
be valued intrinsically, irrespective of humans’ derived well-being. It is argued that actual
policy should in principle reflect such views but that more research is needed here.
To illustrate these points, consider the following example: A referendum-mimicking
survey is conducted to measure people’s WTP for preserving a certain species, and the
estimated total WTP exceeds total cost (say 1 million USD) by 50%. There are no direct use-
values involved, and currently living people who did not respond to this survey would get no
increased welfare at all from preserving the species. Should the species be preserved? On the
one hand, assuming we have elicited the preferences correctly the total WTP is larger than the
costs. On the other hand the fraction of the total population who responded to the survey is of
course typically very small, so the overall monetized welfare effects of preserving the species
is most likely much smaller than the costs.
13 On the third hand, people may have other
motives than maximization of their own well-being. First, they may believe that future
generations would be directly affected through ecosystem effects, and that their (expected)
welfare should also count (at least somewhat) in today’s decision making. This is clearly a
legitimate motive, and if the government has not made such considerations WTP figures
based on such motives should clearly not be excluded. Second, as argued, some respondent
                                               
13 If 1% of the population answered the survey and their responses reflect the welfare effects for them, we have
that these welfare effects are just 1.5% of the costs, or 15,000 USD. Recall that the welfare effects for others are
zero.16
may think that the environment and species should count in social decisions irrespective of
indirect effects on human well-being. Thus, figures on individual WTPs, together with costs,
are insufficient information for policy. We also need information on individual motives,
ethical views, and cognitive strategies and limitations.
However, a caveat must be given regarding possible negative instrumental effects
from excessive paternalism when policy makers believe that people are making bad or
irrational choices. Therefore it may sometimes be advisable for the government to ‘respect’
individual preferences, rather than trying to determine their ‘true’ individual welfare
functions. Indeed, we have clearly seen terrible consequences of excessive paternalistic
decision making in many countries, and as a basic ‘first principle’ consumer sovereignty
appears fundamentally sound. This argument is similar to the recommendation often made by
utilitarians, following Sidgwick (1874), against the use of utilitarianism as a general decision
rule in daily life. The reason is simply that to use such a rule is in itself an action, for which
the consequences may be good or bad. If one believes that the overall social consequences
would be better if people instead apply some simplified agreed-upon ethical rules, then a
convinced utilitarian would argue in favor of using these rules instead.
14 There is nothing
inconsistent with this. Still, in our case it is also clear that people do often want to have
restricted choices. Rational people simply know that they sometimes (or even often) make
bad decisions, and they are aware of their limited self-control and cognitive capacity. Further,
it seems clear that all governments, also those who declare themselves as liberals, sometimes
in some areas apply a certain degree of paternalism. Thus, to neglect analyzing deviations
from consumer sovereignty (in terms of preferences) does not appear to be a reasonable
alternative. But it is important to bear possible instrumental considerations in mind when
discussing policy recommendations in practice.
So, at the end of the day, how can policy-makers use the conclusions from this paper
in practice? Or, expressed alternatively, can they be operationalized in a way that makes them
practically useful, or do they solely produce increased confusion and an increased (and
possibly depressing) awareness that reality is awfully complex? Some conclusions may be
relatively straightforward to apply. For example, if one knows that people’s expressed
preferences for a certain good are based on a completely erroneous information, it may be
possible to adjust a social CBA for this, in order to reflect better individual welfare. Further,
it seems practically possible (although of course difficult) to elicit people’s views about
alternative ethical ends besides individual well-being. Given that a large fraction holds values
                                               
14This is the standard utilitarian response to the popular example about killing a healthy persons walking outside
a hospital in order to save two dying persons, one in a desperate need of a new heart and one of a new liver.
Everything else equal, this would probably be good according to utilitarian ethics, but everything else would not
be equal! Indeed, it is easy to imagine far-reaching consequences of the fact that people could not walk safely
outside a hospital (or elsewhere), implying that utilitarians would agree with non-utilitarians that it would
certainly be a very bad idea to kill the healthy person.17
for the environment or animal well-being per se, this should be reflected in governmental
policy. The extent to which people hold such values, as well as the strength of these values,
are still quite uncertain, however, and more research is clearly needed here.
Some conclusions are less straightforward to apply. It does often not appear
reasonable that one in practice will (or maybe even should) try to measure various individual
degrees of cognitive dissonance, risk misperception, and shortsightedness in order to
construct some kind of modified CBA. On the other hand, much (perhaps most) of economic
relations and variables are very difficult to quantify, including labor-supply and human-
capital relations, but they are still considered to be of practical importance for decision
making. An insight can hence clearly be practically useful even when it is difficult to
quantify, and when it cannot be added to other information in order to construct a unique
index of goodness.
15 So, even though we may not be able to measure cognitive dissonance, or
the difference between individual welfare and preferences, very accurately (and most often
do no measure them at all), the insights of such information may still be of practical
importance in the decision-making process. In all public policy-making there is a certain
amount of quantified information, as well as more qualitative information. This paper can
hopefully contribute to the appropriate use of the quantified information, such as estimated
costs and benefits, and their limitations. In particular, it gives several arguments for why
deviations from the conventional CB rule may be socially preferable, and, perhaps more
importantly, in what direction such a deviation should go in different cases.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the mere existence of any deviation from
standard assumptions in economics should of course not be seen as ‘anything goes’-
supporting arguments. Indeed, to influence a political decision by for example cognitive-
dissonance arguments, some indications of their importance in the particular case, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, must be provided. Still, there are presumably many cases
where such aspects are crucial, and where their importance can be made likely.
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